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1．Introduction
 After the several years of experience in electricity procurement auctions 
in the retail electricity market, auctioneers? behavior of bundling several 
contracts started to appear more frequently. This paper investigates the effect 
of such bundling behavior on bid price and competition.
 In these electricity procurement auctions, auctioneers decide whether 
contracts should be bundled or not. When an auctioneer sells a bundle of 
contracts at auction, bidders submit their bids for the bundle. Therefore, unlike 
recently well-discussed combinatorial auctions, bidders do not have flexibility 
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to choose between submitting a package and stand-alone bids. It is so called 
pure bundling in literature. 
 There are several potential effects from such bundling. The practice of 
bundling or tying is not limited to auctions and there is a growing body of 
literature on the rationale for bundling by a multiproduct monopolist. The 
main reasons for bundling are: ?i? complementarity between the different 
objects and ?ii? production synergies such as economies of scale and scope. 
However, more recent work has shown additional explanations for bundling. 
For example, consider the case where consumers have unit demand for each 
of the objects and their valuation for a bundle of objects is just the sum of 
the valuations for each object. Each consumer?s valuation is independently 
distributed across objects. Then, it has been shown that bundling increases the 
seller?s profit as long as the correlation of each consumer?s valuation is not too 
positive ?see Varian ?????. Similarly, Bakos and Brynjolfsson ?????? showed 
that bundling a large number of information goods, which incurs almost 
zero marginal cost, raised the seller?s revenue. This is because the law of large 
numbers makes the consumers? valuations converge to a certain value, and it 
was easier to predict the consumers? valuations. Therefore, by bundling, 
the seller could extract almost all consumer surplus by setting an appropriate 
price. 
 In a procurement auction setting, Olivares et al. ?????? realized that 
even in the absence of cost synergies, bidders may have incentive to submit 
discounted bids for bundles. They call such behavior strategic bundling. The 
discount from strategic bundling arises because, similar to the problem of 
multiproduct monopolists described above, the dispersion of the minimum 
valuations by the opponent bidders for a bundle is smaller than that for a 
component. Such strategic bundling may cause efficiency to deteriorate in the 
sense that a bidder with lower costs for individual contracts might not obtain 
the contract.
 Chernomaz and Levin ?????? also introduced another type of problem, 
namely bidder asymmetries due to bundling. Asymmetry may arise when 
not all bidders can purchase a bundle of objects because of limitations such 
as capacity, financial, or geographical constraints. Then, auctions become 
asymmetric, in the sense of Maskin and Riley ??????, and, hence, may result 
in an inefficient outcome. Olivares et al. ?????? argued that if previous 
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experience matters to form bidders? costs in procurement auctions and if the 
bundling excludes some bidders because of some form of constraint, then 
inactive firms would have disadvantages in future auctions and competition 
may deteriorate. 
 The current study conducts simple reduced form analyses to investigate 
the effect of bundling on bid price and competition using the dataset of 
the electricity procurement auctions in Japan?s retail electricity market. 
The positive aspects of bundling are expected because it is considered that 
electricity distribution realizes economies of scale and density. On the other 
hand, there exists the possibility of negative aspects of bundling to prevail, 
such as the strategic bundling and the exclusion of small bidders. The current 
study confirms some aspects that the previous literature discusses. 
 In the related literature, Palfrey ?????? was a pioneer investigator 
of bundling in an auction setting. He found that the decisions of 
sellers on bundling depended on the number of bidders in auctions. 
If the number of bidders was small, sellers had higher incentives to 
bundle several objects. He also showed that when there were more than 
two buyers, the buyer with the higher valuation preferred bundling. 
The reason for this is similar to the multiproduct monopolist?s 
reason for bundling. That is, the distribution of valuations for a bundle 
becomes a mean-preserving contraction of the distributions of valuations for 
its component objects. Buyers that are on the upper tail of the distribution 
of valuations for the bundle are more likely to win the bundled auction than 
in the separate auctions. Armstrong ?????? investigated the optimal auction 
for a multiproduct monopolist. He investigated the optimal auction when the 
monopolist could sell the objects separately on the separate auctions as well 
as under a certain degree of bundling. He concluded that the optimal auction 
again depended on the number of bidders. 
 In the empirical literature, Cantillon and Pesendorfer ?????? 
investigated the identification problem in the first-price multi-unit auction. 
The research was motivated by the actual practice of combinatorial auctions 
to distribute bus routes in London. In those auctions, bidders were allowed to 
bid on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. One important 
finding was that there need not be cost synergies for choices of combinatorial 
bids because there was a strategic motive for combinatorial bids arising 
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from the competition between combinatorial bids and stand-alone bids ?the 
threshold problem?. Those authors developed and applied the estimation 
methods to the dataset of the London bus routes market to quantify the 
magnitude of cost synergies. Kim et al. ?????? investigated the performance 
of the Chilean school meals auction. They developed estimation methods 
that overcome the computational difficulties arising from the large number 
of observed bids in a combinatorial auction. Chernomaz and Levin ?????? 
established the model of combinatorial first price auctions and conducted an 
experiment to investigate the optimality and efficiency of such auctions. They 
showed that there was a trade-off between synergies arising from packaging 
and the threshold problem. The threshold problem could lose efficiency of 
allocations. 
 Chernomaz and Levin ?????? argued that the degree of synergies 
arising from packaging was an important factor in determining whether 
packaging is optimal for the auctioneer. With the existence of negative aspects 
of packaging such as the threshold problem, the auctioneer should only allow 
package bidding when there are enough synergies realized from packaging. 
Therefore, there are many empirical studies that investigate whether synergies 
are realized by winning multiple objects. Olivares et al. ?????? estimated the 
magnitude of cost synergies under the combinatorial auctions using Chilean 
school meals procurement auctions to answer the question of which packaging 
should be allowed. 
 Our goal is to investigate the effect of the current ?pure? bundling 
behavior on revenue and efficiency. Furthermore, because pure bundling 
can never be solely optimal, it would be interesting if we can investigate the 
effect of introducing a combinatorial auction. However, our reduced form 
analyses do not allow us to compare the current outcome with counterfactuals. 
Therefore, to answer these questions, we need to wait for a structural 
analysis planned as the next step. Yet, our reduced form analyses found some 
interesting facts. First, we found that even after controlling for the scale of 
auctions, bundling reduces the bid price, implying that there exists a bid 
discounting effect of bundling other than the synergies from scale economy. 
Second, bundling several electricity contracts in different locations reduces the 
money left on the table, implying it reduces the uncertainty that the bidders 
face. Third, bundling also affects the participation behavior of the bidders. 
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Bundling increases the number of bidders in auctions, but this effect is limited 
to the strong bidders. 
2．Electricity procurement auction and bundling
 In Japan?s retail electricity market, ?? electric power companies ?EPCs? 
used to supply electricity as local monopolists. The liberalization started in 
????, and the new electricity companies, known as Power Producers and 
Suppliers ?PPSs? started to supply electricity at unregulated rates. The 
liberalization was conducted gradually. In the starting year of ????, the PPSs 
were only allowed to supply users with electric power and voltage requirements 
greater than ???? kilowatts ?kW? and ?? kilovolts ?kV?, respectively. The 
target of liberalization was later expanded to users with power and voltage 
requirements greater than ??? kW and ???? V in ????, then to ?? kW in 
????, and it was entirely liberalized in ????.  
 With this wave of liberalization in the retail market, the government 
and public agencies started to employ first-price sealed bid auctions to procure 
electric power for public facilities, including waterworks, roadway facilities, 
schools, hospitals, and government office buildings. The ?former monopoly? 
general electric power companies and the PPSs compete on these auctions. 
During the period between April ???? and March ????, which our dataset 
covers, ?,??? contracts with ?? million MWh were auctioned. 
 The auction-letting process is as follows. Each public agency advertises 
auctions on its webpage, in its official gazette, or in newspapers. These 
advertisements include detailed information including the contract period, the 
required maximum ?peak? power ?kW?, the ?expected? amount of electricity 
they use during the contract period ?kWh?, the detailed plan for usage 
including the peak demand, daytime demand, nighttime demand and summer 
demand, the place of delivery, the qualifications needed for participating in the 
tendering process, and the time limit for tenders. The participants submit the 
total charge, including the fixed and variable rates, for the amount of electricity 
they would supply for the whole contract period. They compete on the total 
charge. The bidder submitting the lowest bid that is lower than the reserve 
price wins the auction. If the lowest bid is higher than the reserve price, then 
the agency either conducts a second auction ?usually scheduled a few weeks 
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after the original auction? or enters into bargaining with one of the bidders.
 Contracts are sometimes bundled together to be auctioned. After the 
several years of auction experience, this practice of bundling several contracts 
started to be observed more frequently. For example, Osaka Legal Affairs 
Bureau used to offer contracts for its agency office buildings separately in 
????. But, in ????, it bundled the ?? contracts for individual office buildings 
together, and conducted one auction for the bundled contracts. Similarly, 
Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau started to bundle the contracts for ?? tax 
offices together in ????. On the other hand, Nagoya Regional Taxation 
Bureau continued to offer individual auctions for each tax office in both ???? 
and ????. 
3．Data and descriptive statistics
 All electric power procurement auctions conducted throughout Japan 
between ???? and ???? fiscal years are identified by the Electric Daily News, 
a newspaper specializing in electricity markets. The Electric Daily News data 
contain information on the date when bids opened, the government agency 
?the auctioneer?, the required peak power ?kW?, the amount of electricity 
required ?kWh?, the load factor, the contract period, the place of delivery, the 
winner of each auction, the winning bid, either the identity or number of other 
bidders, and other descriptive auction information, including whether there 
is a restriction on CO? emissions. Whereas the data contain a large number 
of observations, they do not include losing bids ?i.e., we only have winning 
bids? and for most cases, the identity of losing bidders. Therefore, we asked 
each auctioneer to reveal the identities of all bidders and their bid amounts 
by sending letters through the official information disclosure system in Kanto 
area where the largest EPC, TEPCO, used to operate as a local monopoly. 
We use these auction data from Kanto area between the fiscal years ???? and 
????. 
 Table ? presents the summary statistics of the data. In our datasets, ??? 
auctions were identified after excluding missing information. The table shows 
the characteristics of such auctions. We can see from the sixth row that these 
auctions were not very competitive. The average number of participants was 
less than two, which means for many auctions, there was only one participant, 
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TEPCO. The variable Incumbent only had the value of ? if there was only one 
participant in the auction. We can see that about ?? ? of auctions had only 
one participant. The variable Incumbent win had the value of ? if the general 
electric company ?the former monopolist? won the auction. We can see that 
about ??? of auctions were won by the former monopolist or incumbent. The 
variable CO? had the value ? if the contract had CO? emission restrictions. 
Because the PPSs usually had fossil fuel power stations that generate more 
CO?, they tended to be disadvantaged in auctions with CO? emission 
restrictions ?see Hattori and Saegusa ?????. Load factor is the ratio between 
the average and maximum ?peak? usage of electricity during the contract 
period. This was calculated as the required amount per year divided by the 
required capacity, that is, the kWh divided by ?the maximum power ?kW?
?? ????. A low load factor induces inefficiency because electricity companies 
need to hold capacity that is not used most of the time. On the other hand, 
high load factor can be a burden for the PPSs because fuel power plants are 
usually used for peak usage. The variable high voltage is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of ? if the contract for auction is for voltage greater than 
??,???V. The last row of the table shows the average unit bid ?yen/kWh?. 
There are ??? observations, and, naturally, the average unit bid is higher than 
average unit winning bid ?unit winning bid?. 
Table 1 : Summary statistics of the variables
Variable # of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Unit winning bid ??? ??.?? ?.?? ?.?? ??.??
Peak power (kW) ??? ?,???.?? ?,???.?? ??.?? ??,???.??
Load factor ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Amount (thousand kWh) ??? ??,??? ??,??? ?? ???,???
# of participants ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
High voltage ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Contract length ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
CO? ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Incumbent only ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Incumbent win ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Unit bid ??? ??.?? ?.?? ?.?? ??.??
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 In Kanto area, there were ?? auctions observed in which several 
contracts were bundled. For example, Tokyo Legal Affairs Bureau bundled 
the contracts of electricity for ?? local offices. Yokohama city bundled the 
contracts for nine public high schools together. These auctions bundle the 
electricity contracts for distinct locations. On the other hand, some auctions 
bundle several contracts for the same location. For example, Kanagawa, Ibaragi, 
and Chiba prefectures bundled the contracts for different office buildings 
within the same site. Ibaragi prefecture bundled the contract for the public 
hospital and that for the related facilities in the same site. Although both types 
similarly bundled several contracts, they might be considered differently by 
the electricity companies because supplying electricity to different areas might 
not be the same as supplying electricity to the same area because of differences 
in the transmission and distribution networks. Therefore, we call the first type 
as Type-I bundling and second as Type-II bundling, and try to see the effect 
of bundling by distinguishing them. ?Bundling?, however, includes both types 
otherwise specified. 
 Table ? compares the auction characteristics between ordinary auctions 
and auctions under which several contracts are bundled. The asterisks next 
to the differences in the last column indicate the significance level of the 
t-test. We can see that the maximum power ?peak power? is higher under the 
bundled auctions, but this difference is not statistically significant. The total 
amount of electricity to be supplied ?amount? is lower under the bundled 
auctions but this is again not statistically significant. Higher power and lower 
amount are reflected in a lower load factor under the bundled auctions with 
statistical significance. We can also see that under the bundled auctions, the 
unit winning bid is higher with statistical significance. The ratio of auctions 
where only the incumbent participates ?incumbent only? is lower whereas 
the number of participants is higher with statistical significance under the 
bundled auctions. The winning rate of incumbent ?incumbent win? is lower 
with statistical significance as well. This suggests that the PPSs are more likely 
to participate into bundled auctions and therefore win such auctions. However, 
this might merely be the effect of the differences in the characteristics of 
bundling and ordinary auctions, such as lower load factor under the bundled 
auctions. To see whether bundling itself affects the participation of the PPSs, 
we undertook regressions to account for these differences in characteristics. 
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 Table ? presents the differences in auction characteristics between the 
ordinary and Type-I bundled auctions. As noted above, Type-I consists of 
the auctions in which the contracts for the different locations are bundled 
together. We can see from Table ?, when we exclude the bundled auctions 
under which the several auctions for the same sites are bundled ?Type-II?, 
that there are no statistically significant differences in the numbers of 
participants, incumbent only, and incumbent win. This implies that the PPSs 
are more likely to participate in the Type-II bundling auctions. The reason 
might be that distributing electricity to different locations at the same time 
might be costly for the PPSs. 
Table 2 : Differences in auction characteristics between ordinary and bundled auctions
Ordinary auctions Bundled auctions Difference
Variable # of observations Mean Std. Dev.
# of 
observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean
Unit winning bid ??? ??.?? ?.?? ?? ??.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
Peak power (kW) ??? ????.?? ????.?? ?? ????.?? ????.?? ????.??
Load factor ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ***
Amount (thousand kWh) ??? ????? ????? ?? ????? ????? –???
# of participants ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
High voltage ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Contract length ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
CO? ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Incumbent only ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ***
Incumbent win ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ***
Unit bid ??? ??.?? ?.?? ?? ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ***
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance levels of ??, ?? and ???, respectively.
Table 3 : Differences in auction characteristics between ordinary and Type-I bundled auctions
Ordinary auctions Type I bundling Difference
Variable # of observations Mean Std. Dev.
# of 
observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean
Unit winning bid ??? ??.?? ?.?? ?? ??.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
Peak power (kW) ??? ????.?? ????.?? ?? ????.?? ????.?? ????.?? *
Load factor ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.??
Amount (thousand kWh) ??? ????? ????? ?? ????? ????? ????
# of participants ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.??
High voltage ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Contract length ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
CO? ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
Incumbent only ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.??
Incumbent win ??? ?.?? ?.?? ?? ?.?? ?.?? –?.??
Unit bid ??? ??.?? ?.?? ?? ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ***
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance levels of ??, ?? and ???, respectively.
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4．Empirical results
Unit bid
 We first estimate the effects of auction characteristics on unit bid. 
The unit bid is defined as the bid divided by the amount of electricity to be 
supplied. Table ? presents the empirical results on the unit bid. Estimation 
??? includes the load factor, quadratic of load factor, inverse of load factor, 
logarithm of peak power ?kW? and its quadratic, high voltage dummy, the 
number of participants, the contract length, CO? dummy, and the bundling 
dummy variable that takes a value ? if the auction bundles several contracts. 
We also include the interaction term between the bundling dummy and the 
logarithm of peak power. We can see from the table that all variables, except 
the high voltage dummy, the interaction term of bundling dummy and the 
logarithm of peak power, and the CO? dummy, statistically significantly affect 
the unit bids. Higher load factor reduces the unit bid for a certain value of load 
factor. However, if the load factor is sufficiently high, the higher load factor 
increases the unit bid. This makes sense because contracts with extremely low 
and high load factors are very costly for electricity companies. 
 The logarithm of peak power and its quadratic are both statistically 
significant. We calculate the marginal effect of peak power. The average 
value of the marginal effect is –?.???, implying that there is a scale merit on 
electricity contracts on average. We see that the unit bid is lower under the 
bundling auction. This discounted bid of bundling exists even after controlling 
for the peak power. In addition, the unit bid is lower when the number of 
bidders is higher, and the unit bid is higher for contracts with longer periods. 
The lower unit bid with the larger number of bidders is consistent with 
auction theory. The reason for the higher unit bid with a longer contract 
period may be that risk and uncertainty increase with the longer period and 
therefore the costs to the electricity companies increase. 
 The right panel of Table ? shows the results of Estimation ???. 
Estimation ??? includes the same variables as Estimation ???, except that 
the definition of bundling is changed. In Estimation ???, the bundling 
dummy takes a value of ? if the auction is Type-I bundling, i.e., auctions that 
bundle the contracts in different locations. We can see that in Estimation 
???, the coefficient on bundling is no longer statistically significant, and its 
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sign is changed to positive. From the results on Estimations ??? and ???, we 
conclude that bundling reduces bid price only when the bundled contracts 
are for the same site. When the companies need to distribute electricity to 
different locations, their costs seem to increase to offset the any discounting 
effect of bundling.  
Money left on the table
 We now investigate the effect of bundling on money left on the table, 
i.e., the difference between the lowest and the second lowest bids. The 
higher money left on the table may result from higher uncertainty. Therefore, 
if bundling reduces uncertainty or dispersion of the cost distribution, as 
suggested by the theories such as Bakos and Brynjolfsson ??????, it would 
reduce the money left on the table. We regress the money left on the table on 
the same covariates as the above estimation. The left panel of Table ? shows 
the empirical results obtained from this regression. We can see that bundling 
does not affect the money left on the table. The right panel of the table shows 
Table 4 : Empirical results on unit bid
Estimation (?) with bundling Estimation (?) with Type-I bundling
Unit bid Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Load factor –??.?? ?.?? *** –??.?? ?.?? ***
Load factor? ??.?? ?.?? *** ??.?? ?.?? ***
?/load factor ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
Log (kw) ?.?? ?.?? ** ?.?? ?.?? **
Log (kw)? –?.?? ?.?? ** –?.?? ?.?? **
High voltage –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
Bundling –?.?? ?.?? ** ?.?? ?.??
Bundling? log(kw) ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
The number of 
participants –?.?? ?.?? * –?.?? ?.?? *
Contract length ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
CO? –?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Constant ??.?? ?.?? *** ??.?? ?.?? ***
Fiscal year dummy Yes Yes
F (??,   ???) ???.?? ???.??
Adj R-squared ?.???? ?.???
The # of observations ??? ???
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance levels of ??, ?? and ???, respectively.
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the empirical results when we change the definition of bundling. In the 
Estimation ??? in Table ?, the dummy variable bundling takes the value of ? 
if the auction bundles the contracts in different locations ?Type-I bundling?. 
We see that under the Estimation ???, bundling does affect money left on 
the table as well as the interaction term between bundling and the logarithm 
of peak power. We calculate the marginal effect of bundling for each value of 
log ?kW?. The average value of the marginal effect of bundling is –?.???. It 
seems that, on average, bundling reduces uncertainty. However, this is only the 
case of bundling with contracts in different locations. This is consistent with 
the theories such as Bakos and Brynjolfsson ?????? because they showed 
that to reduce the uncertainly, each individual contract needs to be sufficiently 
negatively correlated. This is probably not the case for auctions that bundle 
the contracts within the same site. 
Table 5 : Empirical results on money left on the table
Estimation (?) with bundling Estimation (?) with Type-I bundling
Money left on the table Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Load factor –??.?? ??.?? –??.?? ??.?? **
Load factor? ??.?? ??.?? ??.?? ??.??
?/load factor ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
Log (kw) ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
Log (kw)? –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? ***
High voltage ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
Bundling –?.?? ?.?? ??.?? ?.?? ***
Bundling? log(kw) –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? ***
The number of 
participants –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? *
Contract length –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
CO? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Constant –??.?? ??.?? ** –??.?? ??.?? **
Fiscal year dummy Yes Yes
F (??,   ???) ?.?? ?.??
Adj R-squared ?.???? ?.????
The # of observations ??? ???
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance levels of ??, ?? and ???, respectively.
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Participation
 We now investigate the participation behavior of electricity companies. 
First, we regress the number of participants on the same covariates ?except 
the number of participants? as above to see whether bundling affects 
participation. The left panel of Table ? shows the empirical results of the 
number of participants. We see that the bidder?s participation depends on the 
load factor, the scale, the high voltage dummy and the bundling dummy. We 
show only the results of Type-II bundling because we found other bundling 
definitions do not affect the bidder?s participation behavior. We see that the 
bundling dummy and the interaction term between bundling and logarithm 
of peak power are statistically significant. We calculate the marginal effect of 
the bundling, and its average value is ?.???. We conclude that, on average, 
bundling increases the number of participants. This implies that bundling 
attracts bidders not merely because it increases scale. The middle panel of 
Table ? shows the empirical results of the ratio of auctions where only the 
incumbent participates ?incumbent only?. We see that the bundling-related 
variables are not statistically significant. This may imply that along with 
the results of the number of participants, bundling increases the number of 
participants in the auctions where there are already some PPSs participating. 
The right panel of Table ? shows the empirical results of the winning rate of 
Table 6 :  Empirical results of the number of participants, the ratio of the auctions where only 
the incumbent participates, and the ratio of the auctions where the incumbent wins
The # participants Incumbent only Incumbent win
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Load factor –??.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
Load factor? ??.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? ***
?/load factor ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Log (kw) ?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? ***
Log (kw)? –?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
High voltage ?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
Type II Bundling –?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? *
Type II Bundling? log(kw) ?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? **
Contract length ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? ***
CO? ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Constant –?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
Fiscal year dummy Yes Yes Yes
F (??,   ???) ??.?? ??.?? ??.??
Adj R-squared ?.???? ?.???? ?.????
The # of observations ??? ??? ???
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance levels of ??, ?? and ???, respectively.
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the incumbent. We see that here bundling-related variables are statistically 
significant. We find that the average marginal effect of the bundling is –?.???. 
We see that, under bundling, the winning rate of the incumbent is reduced 
because there are more PPSs participating in such auctions. 
 We also investigate the effect of bundling on the participation decision 
of each bidder. Because the incumbent company participates in almost all 
auctions, we focus on the behavior of the PPSs. We investigate the top five 
most frequently participated PPSs. PPS? participated in ??.?? of auctions, 
PPS? participated in ??.??, PPS? participated in ??.??, PPS? participated 
in ??.??, and PPS? participated in ?.?? of auctions. We show only the 
effect of Type-II bundling because Type-I bundling did not affect any PPS?s 
behavior. 
 Table ? shows the empirical results of each PPS?s participation decision. 
The first panel represents the regression results of PPS??s participation rate 
on the covariates. It is shown that Type-II bundling affected its participation 
decision. We calculate the marginal effect of the bundling on PPS??s 
participation rate, and calculate its average. The average marginal effect of 
bundling was ?.???, implying that Type-II bundling on average increases 
the participation rate of PPS? by ?.??. Similarly, the effect of bundling is 
statistically significant for PPS??s and PPS??s participation rates, as shown 
in the second and third panels, respectively. The average marginal effects of 
bundling are calculated as ?.??? and ?.??? for PPS? and PPS?, respectively. 
That is, bundling increases the participation rates of PPS? and PPS? by 
?.?? and ?.??, respectively. On the other hand, the effect of bundling is not 
statistically significant for PPS?. 
 The effect of bundling is statistically significant for PPS?, but the 
calculated average marginal effect of bundling is –?.???. Thus, it seems that 
bundling lowers the participation rate of PPS? by ?.??. 
  From the above regression results for an individual bidder?s 
participation decision, we conclude that bundling increases the participation 
rate of the PPSs that have already had a certain level of experience. Bundling 
is not attractive for fringe bidders that participate in less than ??? of auctions. 
If the bidders with more experience are low cost bidders, this finding is 
consistent with the theory of the previous researches such as Palfrey ??????. 
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5．Conclusion
 Our reduced form analyses show some interesting findings. The 
regression of unit bid shows that even after controlling for the scale of 
auctions, there is a bid discount on bundled auctions. That is, there seems to 
be a bid discounting effect of bundling other than the synergies from economy 
of scale. This evidence is found only for Type-II bundling probably because 
the cost of distributing electricity to different locations in Type-I bundling 
offsets the discounting effect of bundling. There are some possible reasons 
Table 7 : Empirical results of each PPS’s participation rate
PPS1 PPS2 PPS3
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Load factor –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? ***
Load factor? ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? ***
?/load factor ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? **
Log (kw) ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? * ?.?? ?.??
Log (kw)? –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
High voltage ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Type ? Bundling –?.?? ?.?? ** –?.?? ?.?? *** –?.?? ?.?? *
Type ? Bundling? log(kw) ?.?? ?.?? ** ?.?? ?.?? *** ?.?? ?.?? *
Contract length ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? * ?.?? ?.??
CO? ?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
Constant –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
Fiscal year dummy Yes Yes Yes
F_value ??.?? ??.?? ?.??
Adj R-squared ?.???? ?.???? ?.????
The # of observations ??? ??? ???
PPS4 PPS5
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Load factor –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? ***
Load factor? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
?/load factor ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
Log (kw) ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
Log (kw)? –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
High voltage ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? **
Type ? Bundling –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? ***
Type ? Bundling? log(kw) ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ***
Contract length ?.?? ?.?? ?.?? ?.??
CO? –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.?? **
Constant –?.?? ?.?? –?.?? ?.??
Fiscal year dummy Yes Yes
F_value ?.?? ?.??
Adj R-squared ?.???? ?.????
e # of observations ??? ???
Note:  ***, ** and * represent the significance levels of ??, ?? and ???, respectively.
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for the discounting effect ?other than the synergies from scale economy? of 
bundling. The first candidate is the strategic bundling discussed in Olivares et 
al. ??????. Because the distribution of the minimum cost of the other bidders 
for a bundle has lower dispersion, a bidder can submit a lower bid. The second 
candidate is that bundling reduces bidders? risk and therefore shifts their cost 
distribution to the lower side. The bidders in the retail electricity auctions 
bear risk such that consumers may use more electricity than they planned. In 
such a case, the retail electricity companies still need to supply electricity to 
meet the extra demand and there is a cost of preparing electricity supply to 
meet such sudden increasing demand. If a company cannot supply electricity 
to meet demand, it is required to pay monetary penalty. Under bundling, such 
unexpected deviation between planned and actual demand may be diversified, 
and therefore, bidders might have lower costs under bundling. 
 The two scenarios above, the strategic bundling and the risk lowering 
effect, are different in terms of the effect of bundling on cost distributions. 
The first scenario is based on the effect to reduce the dispersions of cost 
distributions while the second one is based on the effect to shift the 
distributions. If the dispersions of cost distributions is smaller, then the money 
left on the table should be smaller, but we did not find such evidence on 
Type-II bundling. Therefore, we conclude that the bid discounting effect from 
Type-II bundling is due to lower risk on bundling contracts. It seems that we 
do not need to worry about inefficiency arising from strategic bundling. 
 We find, however, that bundling selects particular PPSs to participate 
auctions. More specifically, bundling increases the participation rate of the 
PPSs with more experience. Such selection may deteriorate future competition 
by reducing the number of bidders and by reducing experience of the fringe 
bidders. 
 Our next step is to conduct a structural analysis that allows us to 
investigate the counterfactuals. Under a structural analysis, we can compare 
the current bundling outcome to the counterfactual outcome when the 
contracts had not been bundled. Furthermore, we can investigate the effect of 
introducing counterfactual auction systems, including a combinatorial auction 
system, in these electricity procurement auctions. 
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